Reputation and signaling in asset sales

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hartman-Glaser, Barney
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.05.009
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 245-265
• 关键词: Costly signaling; reputation; repeated games; Asset-backed securities

摘要

Static adverse selection models of security issuance show that informed issuers can perfectly reveal their private information by maintaining a costly stalce in the securities they issue. This paper shows that allowing an issuer to both signal current security quality via retention and build a reputation for honesty leads that issuer to misreport quality even when owning a positive stake, that is, the equilibrium is neither separating nor pooling. An issuer retains less as reputation improves and prices are more sensitive to retention when the issuer has a worse reputation. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.