Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cohen, Alma; Wang, Charles C. Y.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 637-647
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; STAGGERED BOARDS; Takeover defense; ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS; Firm value; DELAWARE; Airgas

摘要

Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.