Customer concentration and loan contract terms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Campello, Murillo; Gao, Janet
• 署名单位: Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.03.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 108-136
• 关键词: Customer concentration; bank loans; Contract terms; Financial distress; instrumental variables

摘要

We study pricing and non-pricing features of loan contracts to gauge how the credit market evaluates a firm's customer-base profile and supply-chain relations. Higher customer concentration increases interest rate spreads and the number of restrictive covenants featured in newly initiated as well as renegotiated bank loans. Customer concentration also abbreviates the maturity of those loans as well as the relationship between firms and their banks. These effects are intensified by customers' financial distress, the level of relationship-specific investments, and the use of trade credit in customer-supplier relations. Our evidence shows that a deeper exposure to a small set of large customers bears negative consequences for a firm's relations with its creditors, revealing limits to integration along the supply chain. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.