Network centrality and delegated investment performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rossi, Alberto G.; Blake, David; Timmermann, Allan; Tonks, Ian; Wermers, Russ
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; City St Georges, University of London; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Bath
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 183-206
• 关键词: Asset management; networks; INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE; FLOWS; Manager skills

摘要

We show a positive relation between network centrality and risk-adjusted performance in a delegated investment management setting. More connected managers take more portfolio risk and receive higher investor flows, consistent with these managers improving their ability to exploit investment opportunities through their network connections. Greater network connections are shown to be particularly important in reducing the diseconomies of scale for large managers who are well connected. We also use the exogenous merger of two investment consultants, which creates a sudden change in the network connections of the managers they oversee, to provide evidence that a greater number of connections translates into better portfolio performance. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.