Resaleable debt and systemic risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Micheler, Eva
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.12.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 485-504
• 关键词: Resaleable debt; Systemic risk; bankruptcy; Repos; Securities law

摘要

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks' dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank's default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors' creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.