Pay me now (and later): Pension benefit manipulation before plan freezes and executive retirement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stefanescu, Irina; Wang, Yupeng; Xie, Kangzhen; Yang, Jun
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Seton Hall University; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.10.006
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 152-173
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Executive annual bonuses; Defined benefit pension plans; Pension freezes; Executive retirement

摘要

Large US firms modify top executives' compensation before pension-related events. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions. Increases in executive pensions do not appear to be an attempt to improve managerial effort or retention and are more likely to occur at firms with poor corporate governance. These findings suggest that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.