Do universal banks finance riskier but more productive firms?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Neuhann, Daniel; Saidi, Farzad
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Swedish House of Finance; Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.01.011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 66-85
• 关键词: universal banking; financial deregulation; Bank scope; firewalls; Cross-selling

摘要

Using variation in bank scope generated by the stepwise repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US, we show that the deregulation of universal banks allowed them to finance firms with 14% higher volatility. This increase in risk is compensated by lasting improvements in firms' total factor productivity of 3%. Using bank scope-expanding mergers to identify shocks to universal banks' private information about borrower firms, we provide evidence that informational economies of scope across loans and non-loan products account for the firm-level real effects of universal banking. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.