Do real estate agents have information advantages in housing markets?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agarwal, Sumit; He, Jia; Sing, Tien Foo; Song, Changcheng
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Nankai University; National University of Singapore; Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.05.008
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 715-735
• 关键词: Housing market; Real estate agents; Information advantages; Bargaining power; Market distortion

摘要

We use a large housing transaction data set in Singapore to study whether real estate agents use information advantages to buy houses at bargain prices. Agents bought their own houses at prices that are 2.54% lower than comparable houses bought by other buyers. Consistent with information asymmetries, agent buyers have more information advantages in less informative environments, and agent buyers are more likely to buy houses from agent sellers. Agent discounts are from both cherry picking and bargaining power, and bargaining power contributes more to the agent discounts. Agents' advantage consists in their information of available houses and previous purchase prices. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V.