Regulating a model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leitner, Yaron; Yilmaz, Bilge
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.010
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 251-268
• 关键词: Bank regulation; Bayesian persuasion; information design; Internal-risk models; Model-based regulation; Stress tests

摘要

We study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank, but in equilibrium, monitoring induces the bank to produce less information. We show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank's private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. When public models are more precise, banks produce more information, but the regulator may end up monitoring more. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.