A Theory of Negotiated Equity Financing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Giammarino, Ronald M.; Lewis, Tracy
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/1.3.265
• 发表日期: 1988
• 页码: 265
• 关键词: Investment banking; bargaining model; INFORMATION; issues

摘要

We examine the sale of equity within the context of a model of negotiation between a firm and a less well informed purchaser. We introduce a simple form of negotiation by allowing the firm to set the price of the issue and by assuming that the purchaser is a financier-underwriter who acts strategically. This transaction is analyzed as a noncooperative game, and we identify sequential equilibria that are consistent with observed behavior: namely, that negotiations occasionally fail, that market reactions to equity offers are not uniformly negative, and that equity placements are often underpriced.