Do labor markets discipline? Evidence from RMBS bankers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Griffin, John M.; Kruger, Samuel; Maturana, Gonzalo
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Emory University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.11.005
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 726-750
• 关键词: RMBS fraud; Labor market discipline; Financial crisis

摘要

This paper examines whether employees involved in residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) securitization experienced internal and external labor market consequences relative to similar non-RMBS employees in the same banks and why. Senior RMBS bankers experienced similar levels of job retention, promotion, and external job opportunities. Even signers of RMBS deals with high loss and misreporting rates or deals implicated in lawsuits experienced no adverse internal or external labor market outcomes. These findings are likely not explained by targeted or delayed employee discipline, small legal fines, or protection due to pending litigation but are consistent with implicit upper-management approval of RMBS activities. (C) 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.