Capital Structure and Signaling Game Equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Noe, Thomas H.
署名单位：
University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/1.4.331
发表日期：
1988
页码：
331
关键词：
摘要：
In this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game. We prove that, when insiders have perfect information regarding the firm's future cash flows, the application of refinements to the set of admissible equilibria leads to the dominance of debt over equity financing. However, we show that when insiders observe the firm's cash flows imperfectly, there may exist sequential equilibria in which this 'pecking order breaks down and some firms strictly prefer equity to debt financing. We also prove that, despite the breakdown of the pecking order, the announcement effect of equity financing will be negative relative to debt financing.
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