Competitive Equilibrium with Type Convergence in an Asymmetrically Informed Market
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Thakor, Anjan V.
署名单位：
Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/2.1.49
发表日期：
1989
页码：
49
关键词：
LOAN COMMITMENT CONTRACTS
insurance markets
ECONOMICS
MODEL
摘要：
This article studies an asymmetric information game with type convergence, in which, under some realizations of a common uncertainty, inducing informed agents to reveal their types through self selection by contract choke is either costly or impossible. Under other realizations, self-selection permits costless distinctions between informed agents. I obtain sufficient conditions under which contracting with options prior to the realization of the common uncertainty leads to the existence of a perfectly separating costless Nash equilibrium. Applications to variable rate loan commitments and life insurance contracting are discussed.