Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy Law
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Brown, David T.
署名单位：
State University System of Florida; University of Florida
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/2.1.109
发表日期：
1989
页码：
109
关键词：
摘要：
When a firm is in financial distress, in most cases a set of mutually advantageous reorganization plans exist. This article shows that the bankruptcy code, by providing rules governing the negotiation process, yields a unique solution to the reorganization process. In addition, the structure imposed by the code mitigates the holdout problem created by the individual claimant's divergent incentives.
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