Liquidity standards and the value of an informed lender of last resort

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Santos, Joao A. C.; Suarez, Javier
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.10.013
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 351-368
• 关键词: Liquidity standards; Lender of last resort; Bank runs

摘要

We consider a dynamic model in which receiving support from the lender of last resort (LLR) may help banks to weather investor runs. We show the need for regulatory liquidity standards when the underlying social trade-offs make the uninformed LLR inclined to support troubled banks during a run. Liquidity standards increase the time available before the LLR must decide on supporting the bank. This facilitates the arrival of information on the bank's financial condition and improves the efficiency of the decision taken by the LLR, a role that can be modified but not replaced with the use of capital regulation. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.