Entry and competition in takeover auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gentry, Matthew; Stroup, Caleb
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Davidson College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.10.007
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 298-324
• 关键词: Mergers and acquisitions; auctions; structural estimation; NEGOTIATIONS; takeovers; information frictions

摘要

We estimate the degree of uncertainty faced by potential bidders in takeover auctions and quantify how it affects prices in auctions and negotiations. The high degree of uncertainty revealed by our structural estimation encourages entry in auctions but reduces a target's bargaining power in negotiations. In the aggregate, auctions and negotiations produce similar prices, even though auctions are preferred in takeover markets with high uncertainty, while the reverse is true for negotiations. Firm characteristics predict pre-entry uncertainty and thus are informative about the relative performance of auctions and negotiations for individual targets. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.