Communication Costs, Information Acquisition, and Voting Decisions in Proxy Contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhattacharya, U
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/10.4.1065
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 1065
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; games

摘要

This article synthesizes some recent progress in the theories of corporate control and Political lobbying to model the Proxy campaign as a political campaign. The model yields a number of testable implications, only some of which have been examined in the literature. I;or example, if the loss from voting for a ''bad'' dissident exceeds the gain from voting for a ''good'' dissident the model predicts that as communication costs fall, the number of proxy fights increases, announcement day returns decrease, and the fraction of dissident wins first increases and then decreases.