Payment system settlement and bank incentives
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Khan, CM; Roberds, W
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/11.4.845
发表日期：
1998
页码：
845
关键词：
摘要：
In this article, we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments, Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves, but increases moral hazard problems. The put option value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default.