All the president's friends: Political access and firm value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brown, Jeffrey R.; Huang, Jiekun
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.05.004
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 415-431
• 关键词: Political access; Firm value; government contracts; Regulatory relief

摘要

Using data on White House visitors from 2009 through 2015, we find that corporate executives' meetings with key policymakers are associated with positive abnormal stock returns. We also find evidence suggesting that firms receive more government contracts and are more likely to receive regulatory relief (as measured by the tone of regulatory news) following meetings with federal government officials. Using the 2016 presidential election as a shock to political access, we find that firms with access to the Obama administration experience significantly lower stock returns following the release of the election result than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our results provide evidence suggesting that political access is of significant value to corporations. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.