Regulating access to international large-value payment systems
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Holthausen, C; Ronde, T
署名单位：
European Central Bank; University of Mannheim
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/15.5.1561
发表日期：
2002
页码：
1561
关键词：
摘要：
This article studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems when banking supervision is national. We focus on the choice between net and real-time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the communication between the public authorities is endogenized. It is shown that the national authorities' incentives are not perfectly aligned concerning the settlement method. Therefore public regulation fails to implement the first-best access criteria. Banks prefer net settlement too often due to limited liability. Still, if banks have superior information about their counterparties, private involvement in access regulation is desirable as it reveals information to the public authorities.