Blockholder voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bar-Isaac, Heski; Shapiro, Joel
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.11.005
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 695-717
• 关键词: Blockholder; Shareholder voting; corporate governance

摘要

Blockholders play a large role in corporate governance. We examine their voting behavior by adding a voter with many votes, i.e., a blockholder, to a standard voting model. A blockholder may not vote with all of her shares. This is efficient because it prevents her from drowning out the information in others' votes. This effect holds even when shares may be traded. Consequently, regulations prohibiting abstention will harm information aggregation, though such regulations may promote information acquisition by blockholders. We extend the model by allowing: the blockholder to announce her information upfront, the possibility of blockholder bias, and asymmetric priors. Crown Copyright (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.