The role of lockups in initial public offerings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brav, A; Gompers, PA
• 署名单位: Duke University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/16.1.1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1
• 关键词: UNDERWRITER; INFORMATION; COSTS; FIRMS; price; run

摘要

In a sample of 2,794 initial public offerings (IPOs), we test three potential explanations for the existence of IPO lockups: lockups serve as (i) a signal of firm quality, (ii) a commitment device to alleviate moral hazard problems, or (iii) a mechanism for underwriters to extract additional compensation from the issuing firm. Our results support the commitment hypothesis. Insiders of firms that are associated with greater potential for moral hazard lockup their shares for a longer period of time. Insiders of firms that have experienced larger excess returns, are backed by venture capitalists, or go public with high-quality underwriters are more likely to be released from the lockup restrictions.