A theory of corporate capital structure and investment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cantillo, M
• 署名单位: Universidad Costa Rica
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhg045
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1103
• 关键词: Financial intermediation; Market equilibrium; DEBT CONTRACTS; bank loans; RENEGOTIATION; CHOICE; reputation; FIRMS

摘要

This article uses a general equilibrium framework to explore the origins and limitations of financial intermediaries. In the model, investors have a generic lending technology that they can improve at a cost. Those who upgrade become intermediaries to exploit their advantage. However, conflicts with depositors will limit the banks' market presence, and they will only lend to moderately endowed firms while bondholders will finance cash-rich corporations. The article also analyzes the extent to which investors adopt the superior lending technique, the nature of bank competition, and how corporate and bank conditions affect interest rates and investment.