Career concerns and resource allocation in conglomerates
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Goel, AM; Nanda, V; Narayanan, MP
署名单位：
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; New York University
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/hhg043
发表日期：
2004
页码：
99
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerates when managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisional cash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability, we show that it is in the managers' interest to over-allocate unobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions. Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's owners to also over-allocate observable capital to the more informative divisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialism and corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segment reporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managers to distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors.