GSIB surcharges and bank lending: Evidence from US corporate loan data

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Favara, Giovanni; Ivanov, Ivan; Rezende, Marcelo
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.026
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1426-1443
• 关键词: GSIB surcharges; Basel III regulation; Bank capital requirements; Bank lending

摘要

Capital surcharges on global systemically important banks (GSIBs) decrease lending to firms but do not have any real effects. Banks subject to higher surcharges reduce loan commitments relative to other banks and also lower their estimates of firm risk. Firms' total borrowing, however, does not fall, as firms switch to other banks. We establish these results using supervisory data on corporate loans and variation in surcharges in the United States. These results contribute to the debate on the costs and benefits of surcharges and regulatory tailoring and their effects on the reallocation of credit supply across financial institutions. Published by Elsevier B.V.