The Sources of Financing Constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nikolov, Boris; Schmid, Lukas; Steri, Roberto
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Southern California; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Luxembourg
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.07.018
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 478-501
• 关键词: financial frictions; moral hazard; limited enforcement; trade-off; dynamic contracting

摘要

Which financial frictions drive firms' financing constraints? We structurally estimate dynamic firm financing models embedding many financial frictions, on panels of public firms and private firms. We focus on limited enforcement, moral hazard, and trade-off models and assess which models rationalize best observed corporate policies across various samples. Our tests, based on empirical policy function benchmarks, favor trade-off models for larger public firms, limited commitment models for smaller public firms, and moral hazard models for Private firms. Our estimates suggest significant financing constraints due to agency frictions and highlight the importance of identifying their sources for firm valuation. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.