Identifying control motives in managerial ownership: Evidence from antitakeover legislation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cheng, SJ; Nagar, V; Rajan, MV
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhh010
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 637
• 关键词: STOCK OPTION EXERCISES; POISON PILL SECURITIES; corporate-control; market valuation; private benefits; voting-rights; trade-off; takeover; WEALTH; firm

摘要

This study uses the introduction of second-generation antitakeover legislation as a natural experimental setting to infer the value that managers place on the control rights conferred by stock ownership. We conjecture that managers will reduce their stockholdings in the post-legislation period because they can ensure their prior level of control while holding fewer risky shares. Using a variety of specifications, we find robust evidence consistent with this revealed preference hypothesis. Further demonstrating the key role played by control considerations in managers' stockholding decisions, the reductions in ownership are concentrated in management teams with higher levels of initial ownership and in firms without poison pills.