Does common ownership really increase firm coordination? *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lewellen, Katharina; Lowry, Michelle
• 署名单位: Dartmouth College; Drexel University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.03.008
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 322-344
• 关键词: COMMON OWNERSHIP; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; corporate governance

摘要

A growing number of studies suggest that common ownership caused cooperation among firms to increase and competition to decrease. We take a closer look at four approaches used to identify these effects. We find that the effects that some studies have attributed to common ownership are caused by other factors, such as differential responses of firms (or industries) to the 2008 financial crisis. We propose a modification to one of the previously used empirical approaches that is less sensitive to these issues. Using this to re-evaluate the link between common ownership and firm outcomes, we find little robust evidence that common ownership affects firm behavior. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.