Capital structure, compensation and incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Douglas, AVS
• 署名单位: University of Waterloo
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhj010
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 605
• 关键词: investment opportunity set; AGENCY COSTS; dividend; debt; RENEGOTIATION; CONTRACTS; DESIGN

摘要

This article illustrates an incentive-aligning role of debt in the presence of optimal compensation contracts. Owing to information asymmetry, value-maximizing compensation contracts allow managerial rents following high investment outcomes. The manager has an incentive to increase these rents by choosing investments that generate greater information asymmetry. An aptly chosen debt level mitigates this incentive, because investments that generate greater information asymmetry have more volatile outcomes. The greater volatility would make the debt risky, causing the shareholders to focus on high outcomes and therefore compensation contracts that reduce managerial rents. At the optimum, the manager avoids opportunistic investments, and the shareholders offer value-maximizing compensation contracts. Empirically, the analysis predicts a negative relationship between leverage and market-to-book that is reversed at extreme market-to-book ratios, a negative relationship between leverage and profitability, a negative relationship between leverage and pay-for-performance, and a positive relationship between pay-for-performance and investment opportunities.