Competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions: An experimental examination
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sade, O; Schnitzlein, C; Zender, JF
署名单位：
State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/hhj005
发表日期：
2006
页码：
195
关键词：
摘要：
An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multiunit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find the actual strategies to be inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than either uniform-price auction and so, contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, it generates the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the actual bid schedules are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply.