Optimal financing with tokens

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Mayer, Simon; Morellec, Erwan
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Chicago; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1038-1067
• 关键词: Coin offering; Security tokens; Optimal financing; Agency conflicts

摘要

We develop a model in which a start-up firm issues tokens to finance a digital platform, which creates agency conflicts between platform developers and outsiders. We show that token financing is preferred to equity financing unless the platform expects strong cash flows, has large financing needs, or faces severe agency conflicts. Tokens are characterized by their utility features, facilitating transactions, and security features, granting cash flow rights. While security features trigger endogenous network effects and spur platform adoption, they also dilute developers' equity stake and incentives so that the optimal level of security features decreases with agency conflicts and financing needs. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.