Loan guarantees and credit supply

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bachas, Natalie; Kim, Olivia S.; Yannelis, Constantine
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.08.008
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 872-894
• 关键词: bank lending; Loan guarantee; Government loans; borrowing; POLICY

摘要

The efficiency of federal lending guarantees depends on whether guarantees increase lending supply or simply act as a subsidy to lenders. We use notches in the guarantee rate schedule for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans to estimate the elasticity of bank lending volume to loan guarantees. We show significant bunching in the loan distribution on the side of the size threshold that carries a more generous loan guarantee. The excess mass implies that increasing guarantee generosity by one percentage point of loan principal would increase per-loan lending volume by $19,000. Excess mass increases in periods with guarantee generosity, and placebo results indicate that the effect disappears when the guarantee notch is eliminated. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.