Should information be sold separately? Evidence from MiFID II I

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guo, Yifeng; Mota, Lira
• 署名单位: Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.037
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 97-126
• 关键词: Analyst research; Information production; MiFID II; Unbundling

摘要

Information production is key to the efficiency of financial markets. Does selling infor-mation separately improve its production? We investigate this question using MiFID II, a European regulation that unbundles research from transactions. We show that unbundling causes fewer research analysts to cover a firm. This decrease does not come from small -or mid-cap firms but is concentrated in large firms. Surprisingly, the reduction in analyst coverage is accompanied by a decrease in forecast error. Further analyses suggest that an-alyst competition enhancement could drive the results: inaccurate analysts drop out, and analysts who stay produce more accurate research. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.