Credit ratings as coordination mechanisms
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Boot, AWA; Milbourn, TT; Schmeits, A
署名单位：
University of Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Washington University (WUSTL); New York University
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/hhj009
发表日期：
2006
页码：
81
关键词：
bond
CONTRACTS
MARKETS
yields
banks
摘要：
In this article, we provide a novel rationale for credit ratings. The rationale that we propose is that credit ratings serve as a coordinating mechanism in situations where multiple equilibria can obtain. We show that credit ratings provide a focal point for firms and their investors, and explore the vital, but previously overlooked implicit contractual relationship between a credit rating agency (CRA) and a firm through its credit watch procedures. Credit ratings can help fix the desired equilibrium and as such play an economically meaningful role. Our model provides several empirical predictions and insights regarding the expected price impact of rating changes.
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