Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feng, Felix Zhiyu; Westerfield, Mark M.
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.12.006
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Capital budgeting; transfer pricing; dynamic contracting; Volatility control; cost of capital

摘要

We study a firm's internal resource allocation using a dynamic principal-agent model with endogenous cash flow volatility. The principal supplies the agent with resources for productive use, but the agent has private control over both project volatility and resource intensity and may misallocate resources to obtain private benefits. The optimal contract can yield either overly risky or overly prudent project selection. It can be implemented with a constant pricing schedule (i.e., a static, decentralized, linear mechanism), giving the agent control over the resource quantities, project risk, and agent's equity share. The implementation rationalizes the use of hurdle rates above a firm's cost of capital and transfer prices above marginal cost, while showing that hurdle rates or transfer prices may not vary with the agent's risk choice. Published by Elsevier B.V.