International evidence on cash holdings and expected managerial agency problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kalcheva, Ivalina; Lins, Karl V.
• 署名单位: Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm023
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1087
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Firm value; Investor protection; capital structure; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; determinants; decisions; Dividends; reserves; COSTS

摘要

This article uses managerial control rights data for over 5000 firms from 31 countries to examine the net costs and benefits of cash holdings. We find that when external country-level shareholder protection is weak, firm values are lower when controlling managers hold more cash. Further, when external shareholder protection is weak we find that firm values are higher when controlling managers pay dividends. Only when external shareholder protection is strong do we find that cash held by controlling managers is unrelated to firm value, consistent with generally prevailing U.S. and international evidence.