Tournaments in mutual-fund families

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kempf, Alexander; Ruenzi, Stefan
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm057
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1013
• 关键词: Incentives; prizes; Divisionalization; performance; COMPETITION

摘要

We examine intrafirm competition in the mutual-fund industry. We test the hypothesis that fund managers within mutual-fund families compete with each other in a tournament. Our empirical study of the US equity mutual-fund market shows that they adjust the risk they take depending on the relative position within their fund family. The direction of the adjustment depends on the competitive situation in that family. Risk adjustments are particularly pronounced among managers of funds with high expense ratios, which are managed by a single manager and which belong to large families.