Dissecting bankruptcy frictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dou, Winston Wei; Taylor, Lucian A.; Wang, Wei; Wang, Wenyu
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Queens University - Canada; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.014
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 975-1000
• 关键词: bankruptcy; structural estimation; Conflicts of interest; asymmetric information

摘要

How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the United States? Two frictions, asymmetric in-formation and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: ex-cess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find large bankruptcy ineffi-ciencies, mainly due to excess delay. Eliminating information asymmetries would increase average total payouts by 4%, and eliminating conflicts of interest would increase them by 18% more. Without these frictions, 14% more cases would be resolved pre-court, and court cases would be 73% shorter. With less delay, bankruptcy's indirect costs would be much lower. In contrast, inefficiencies from excess liquidation and excess continuation are quite small. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.