Dynastic control without ownership: Evidence from post-war Japan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bennedsen, Morten; Mehrotra, Vikas; Shim, Jungwook; Wiwattanakantang, Yupana
• 署名单位: Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; INSEAD Business School; University of Copenhagen; University of Alberta; Kyoto Sangyo University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.018
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 831-843
• 关键词: Family control; OWNERSHIP; succession

摘要

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding-family CEOs while the family owns an in-significant share of equity (defined as less than 5%). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki, and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes family ownership over time. In turn, the transi-tion from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of family legacy and talent. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.