Reputation and investor activism: A structural approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnson, Travis L.; Swem, Nathan
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.07.005
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 29-56
• 关键词: Investor activism; reputation; governance; Hedge funds; structural estimation

摘要

We measure the impact of reputation for proxy fighting on investor activism by estimating a dynamic model in which activists engage a sequence of target firms. Our estimation produces an evolving reputation measure for each activist and quantifies its impact on campaign frequency and outcomes. We find that high reputation activists initiate 3.5 times as many campaigns and extract 85% more settlements from targets, and that reputationbuilding incentives explain 20% of campaign initiations and 19% of proxy fights. Our estimates indicate these reputation effects combine to nearly double the value that activism adds for target shareholders. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.