Bank monitoring: Evidence from syndicated loans

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gustafson, Matthew T.; Ivanov, Ivan T.; Meisenzahl, Ralf R.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.08.017
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 452-477
• 关键词: Bank monitoring; syndicated loans

摘要

We directly measure banks' monitoring of syndicated loans. Banks typically demand borrower information on at least a monthly basis. About 20% of loans involve active monitoring (i.e., site visits or third-party appraisals). Monitoring increases with the lead bank's incentives and the value of information and is negatively associated with loan spreads and maturity. The monitoring captured by our measures can either complement or substitute for covenant-based monitoring, depending on whether the monitoring informs covenant compliance. Banks increase monitoring following deteriorations in borrower financial condition and credit line drawdowns. Finally, monitoring is positively related to future covenant violations and loan renegotiations. (C) 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.