Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laeven, Luc; Levine, Ross
• 署名单位: Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm068
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 579
• 关键词: large shareholders; Investor protection; AGENCY COSTS; Firm value; governance

摘要

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100% small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.