Death by committee? An analysis of corporate board (sub-) committees *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Adams, Renee B.; Ragunathan, Vanitha; Tumarkin, Robert
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Queensland; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.032
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1119-1146
• 关键词: Board of directors; COMMITTEE; decision-making; Sarbanes-Oxley

摘要

Theoretical models of groups suggest that sub-group usage can affect communication among members and group decision-making. To examine the trade-offs from forming subgroups, we assemble a detailed dataset on corporate boards (groups) and committees (subgroups). Boards have increasingly used committees formally staffed entirely by outside directors. Our data show that twenty-five percent of all director meetings occurred in such committees in 1996; this increased to 45% by 2010. Our evidence suggests that granting formal authority to such committees can impair communication and decision-making. Subgroups are relatively understudied, but our results suggest that they play an important role in group functioning and corporate governance. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.