The dating game: Do managers designate option grant dates to increase their compensation?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Narayanan, M. P.; Seyhun, H. Nejat
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm044
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1907
• 关键词: stock; awards

摘要

We provide evidence of two variants of a dating game that entails picking a grant date ex post, that is, after the boards compensation decision is made: back-dating (picking a date before the board decision date), and forward-dating (waiting after the board decision date to observe the stock price behavior). Consistent with back-dating, we find stock return behavior around the grant date to be positively related to reporting lag. In the promptly reported sample, we find stock return behavior and the pattern of reporting lags consistent with forward-dating. Our calculations show that managers can obtain economically significant benefits by playing the dating game.