The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Holderness, Clifford G.
• 署名单位: Boston College
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm069
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1377
• 关键词: corporate-ownership; large shareholders; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; voting-rights; STOCK; governance; MARKET

摘要

This article offers evidence on the ownership concentration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. Ninety-six percent of these firms have blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock. The ownership of U.S. firms is similar to and by some measures more concentrated than the ownership of firms in other countries. These findings challenge current thinking on a number of issues, ranging from the nature of the agency conflict in domestic corporations to the relationship between ownership concentration and legal protections for investors around the world.