Government Control of Privatized Firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bortolotti, Bernardo; Faccio, Mara
• 署名单位: Fondazione Mattei; University of Turin; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn077
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 2907
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; OWNERSHIP; LAW

摘要

We study the change in government control of privatized firms in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. At the end of 2000, after the largest privatization wave in history, governments retained control of 62.4% of privatized firms. In civil law countries, governments tend to retain large ownership positions, whereas in common law countries they typically use golden shares. When we combine these two mechanisms, we find no association between a country's legal tradition and the extent of government control. Rather, we document more prevalent government influence over privatized firms in countries with proportional electoral rules and with a centralized system of political authority.