The rise of dual-class stock IPOs *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aggarwal, Dhruv; Eldar, Ofer; Hochberg, Yael, V; Litov, Lubomir P.
• 署名单位: Yale University; Duke University; Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.12.012
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 122-153
• 关键词: Dual-class; Initial public offerings (IPOs); entrepreneurship; corporate governance; venture capital; Private Firms

摘要

We create a novel dataset to examine the recent rise in dual-class IPOs. We document that dual-class firms have different types of controlling shareholders and wedges between voting and economic rights, and that the increasing popularity of dual-class structures is driven by founder-controlled firms. We find that founders' wedge is greater when founders have stronger bargaining power. The increase in founder control over time is due to greater availability of private capital and technological shocks that reduced firms' needs for external financing. Stronger bargaining power is also associated with a lower likelihood of sunset provisions that terminate dual-class structures. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.