Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-management Appointments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ljungqvist, Alexander; Marston, Felicia; Wilhelm, William J., Jr.
• 署名单位: New York University; University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn106
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 3977
• 关键词: Career concerns; analysts; FIRMS

摘要

We show that relatively optimistic research and even the mere provision of research coverage for the issuer (regardless of its direction) attract co-management appointments for securities offerings. Co-management appointments are valuable because they help banks establish relationships with issuers. These relationships, in turn, substantially increase the banks' chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future. This is true even in the presence of historically exclusive banking relationships.