Bank Debt and Corporate Governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ivashina, Victoria; Nair, Vinay B.; Saunders, Anthony; Massoud, Nadia; Stover, Roger
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania; New York University; York University - Canada; Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn063
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 41
• 关键词: TAKEOVER TARGETS; voting-rights

摘要

In this paper, we investigate the disciplining role of banks and bank debt in the market for corporate control. We find that relationship bank lending intensity and bank client network have positive effects on the probability of a borrowing firm becoming a target. This effect is enhanced in cases where the target and acquirer have a relationship with the same bank. Moreover, we utilize an experiment to show that the effects of relationship bank lending intensity on takeover probability are not driven by endogeneity. Finally, we also investigate reasons motivating a bank's informational role in the market for corporate control.