The dynamics of concealment *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertomeu, Jeremy; Marinovic, Ivan; Terry, Stephen J.; Varas, Felipe
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Stanford University; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.025
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 227-246
• 关键词: voluntary disclosure; structural estimation; Reputations; persuasion

摘要

S C Firm managers likely have more information than outsiders. If managers strategically conceal information, market uncertainty will increase. We develop a dynamic corporate disclosure model, estimating the model using the management earnings forecasts of US public companies. The model, based on the buildup of reputations by managers over time, matches key facts about forecast dynamics. We find that 80% of firms strategically manage information, that managers have superior information around half of the time, and that firms conceal information about 40% of the time. Concealment increases market uncertainty by just under 8%, a sizable information loss. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.